What Happened to Landa: The $5 Real Estate App That Went Dark

This section establishes which legal entity took your money and why the corporate diagram mattered more than the app.

Landa was an issuer, not a broker and not an adviser. When you tapped “buy” you were not buying a house and you were not buying a fund. You were buying membership interests in a single series of a Delaware series limited liability company, and that series held exactly one rental property. The company that found the house, set the price, lent the series the money to buy it, managed the tenant, took a cut of the rent, computed the dividend and ran the only market where the shares traded was the same company throughout: Landa Holdings, Inc., a New York corporation.

The entities

Four SEC filers carried the retail money.

• Landa App LLC, SEC CIK 1815103, formed on November 25, 2019 as Landa Properties A LLC, renamed on April 30, 2020 and converted to a Delaware series limited liability company on May 22, 2020. This was the original and largest issuer.
• Landa App 2 LLC, CIK 1875877, organised June 15, 2021.
• Landa App 3 LLC, CIK 1886606, which filed its Form 1-A in 2022.
• Landa Financing LLC, CIK 1965132, the vehicle behind the product Landa called Lend. Its offering circular describes a continuous offering of up to $75,000,000 of membership interests in any rolling twelve-month period, with the proceeds used to make first mortgage loans on single-family and multi-family dwellings, focused on properties bought by series of Landa App LLC, Landa App 2 LLC and Landa App 3 LLC.

Each house was a separate series with its own operating agreement, its own insurance policy and, in principle, its own liabilities. Landa generally offered 10,000 shares per single-family series and 100,000 shares for a multi-family property, so a $150,000 house became 10,000 tradeable units of roughly $15 each. Landa’s help centre said each series guaranteed no debts of another and that the series LLCs were not collateral for Landa Holdings’ own debt. The same page added the sentence that turned out to matter: Landa was not aware of any court case that had tested the limits of the series structure in federal bankruptcy courts, and a bankruptcy court could apply one series’ assets to another’s liabilities, or to Landa’s generally.

The people and the money

Landa was founded in 2019 by Yishai Cohen, chief executive through the collapse, and Amit Assaraf, the co-founder and former chief technology officer, per TechCrunch’s May 23, 2025 account and Bisnow’s August 13, 2024 investigation.

Landa came out of stealth on August 31, 2022 with a Business Wire announcement of $33M in venture funding: a $25M Series A on top of a previously raised $8M seed, with NFX, 83North and Viola Ventures named. The same launch coverage put $62M of debt alongside the equity (FinSMEs, August 31, 2022). TechCrunch, reading Landa’s investor presentations, reported roughly $60M in short-term loans layered on to buy houses in the low-rate window of 2021 and 2022, and a peak of about 25,000 investors and roughly 400 properties, concentrated in metro Atlanta with several Brooklyn walk-ups.

Note the conflict in Landa’s own numbers. A Business Wire release dated November 2, 2022 said Landa had paid October dividends to more than 30,000 individual investors and was nearing 35,000 investing through the app; a second release dated November 22, 2022 said the app had passed 200,000 registered users. Bisnow put growth at 600 to nearly 25,000 users in Landa’s first year as a public marketplace. Registered users and funded investors are different populations and Landa never reconciled them in a filing. Treat the 200,000 as sign-ups and the 25,000 to 35,000 as people who wired money.

Regulatory status

Landa’s series LLCs were Regulation A Tier 2 issuers. That means an SEC-qualified offering circular, annual Forms 1-K, semi-annual Forms 1-SA and current Forms 1-U, all public on EDGAR, and no requirement that the buyer be accredited. It does not mean the SEC reviewed the business, vouched for the price of a house, or supervised the manager.

A registered broker-dealer sat in the chain but not in the way most buyers assumed. Landa Financing LLC changed its broker-dealer of record from Rialto Markets LLC to Dalmore Group, LLC effective September 21, 2023, per a Form 1-U; the Dalmore agreement, dated July 13, 2023, paid Dalmore up to 1% of the total amount raised, capped at $255,000, and the Manager rather than the investor wrote that cheque. After a series’ offering closed, the PPEX Alternative Trading System, registered with the SEC and operated by North Capital Private Securities Corporation, was the only venue for resale of the shares. Transfer agency ran through Landa Transfer Agent LLC, an affiliate.

We searched SEC litigation releases, administrative proceedings and trading suspensions and found no SEC or FINRA enforcement action against Landa Holdings or any Landa series LLC as of September 18, 2026. Everything that happened to Landa investors happened through a lender’s lawsuit and a state court receivership, not through a securities regulator.

This section walks a dollar from a phone to a tenant and back, and marks each point where Landa Holdings got paid. The past tense is deliberate: none of this machinery has run since 2025.

Sign-up and eligibility

Landa was an app-first product, on iOS and Android, with a web portal at landa.app. There was no accreditation requirement, because Regulation A Tier 2 permits sales to anyone, subject to an investment limit for non-accredited buyers. You had to be 18, a US resident with a Social Security number and a linked US bank account. Identity and anti-money-laundering checks ran through the broker-dealer of record, Dalmore after September 2023. The advertised entry was $5, and that number did the marketing work.

How an offering was sourced and priced

Landa Holdings bought the house first, using its own credit, then sold the shares. That sequence is the whole story. Landa’s own explainer said it purchased properties before listing them, so share prices carried the financing costs of the mortgages taken out to fund them.

Mechanically, each series bought its house from Landa Properties, LLC, another affiliate, and issued an Acquisition Note to the Manager covering the cost. The offering circulars describe those notes as unsecured related-party loans between each series and Landa Holdings, bearing interest of up to 4.5% per annum, with nothing accruing or due before title transferred. Each note included the acquisition fee, set at 5% to 10% of the purchase cost by the Manager in its sole discretion. The share offering’s proceeds then paid that affiliate debt down, fees, expenses, reserves and all.

Read that twice. The money you sent did not buy a house. It repaid Landa Holdings for a house Landa Holdings had already bought, at a price Landa Holdings set, plus a fee Landa Holdings charged itself, plus interest Landa Holdings charged the series.

What the investor actually owned

Membership interests in one series of one Delaware LLC, with no vote on the property, no right to force a sale and no direct claim on the house. Each series elected to be treated as a corporation for US federal income tax purposes, which is why investors received a 1099-DIV rather than a K-1.

Distributions and valuations

Rent arrived at the series, the property manager took its cut, operating costs and debt service came out, and the Manager declared what was left as a monthly dividend. Landa’s help centre called dividends discretionary and variable, calculated per share from the property’s net cash. Prices on the in-app market moved with supply and demand between Landa users; no independent appraiser published a mark.

How the platform got paid, in order

1. At acquisition: 5% to 10% of the purchase cost, in the Manager’s sole discretion. Landa’s consumer-facing material described a one-time fee of up to 6%.
2. On the financing: up to 4.5% interest on the acquisition note the series owed the Manager.
3. Every month a tenant paid: 5% to 10% of gross monthly rent, which the circulars said was “currently expected to be eight percent (8%)”.
4. On every in-app trade: 2% from each side, buyer and seller, which Landa’s help centre attributes to the third-party broker-dealer. A round trip on the only market the shares had cost 4%.
5. On the offering itself: up to 1% of the amount raised, capped at $255,000, to Dalmore, paid by the Manager.
6. At the parent: $33M of equity and $62M of debt against the same portfolio, serviced from the same rent.

Landa’s marketing line was that there were no upfront costs and no recurring monthly fees to open an account. That was true and beside the point. The fees were inside the vehicle, not on the statement, and the one an investor could see, the 2% on trading, applied to the only exit he had.

As of September 18, 2026 there is nothing on offer. Landa’s site states that there are no active offerings and that deposits and secondary trading are paused. This section records what was sold, because that determines what you hold.

Single-family rental series

The core product. One house, one Delaware series, generally 10,000 shares, priced so that a share was a small two-figure sum and a $5 order bought a fraction of one. The portfolio was concentrated in metro Atlanta, with Bisnow reporting more than 200 single-family rentals there plus several Brooklyn apartment buildings. Series names in the filings read as street addresses: 303 Kelly’s Walk, Locust Grove, GA; 153 and 137 Spring Valley Circle, Stockbridge, GA. Dividends were monthly and discretionary. There was no stated term and no stated exit date.

Multi-family series

Larger buildings offered as series with 100,000 shares instead of 10,000. Same structure, same fees, smaller count.

Lend

Landa Financing LLC, qualified in 2023, sold membership interests in a vehicle that made mortgage loans secured by property, including loans to Landa’s own series. Most retail buyers never priced this part of the stack: a Lend investor was lending to the same manager whose equity he might also own, while that manager borrowed tens of millions in the commercial market against the same houses. Landa Financing reported gross offering proceeds of about $821,370 at December 31, 2023 and $1,410,080 at June 30, 2024. In Landa’s Q1 2024 report, Lend issued its ninth mortgage and distributed $16,874 for the quarter, 10% more than the quarter before. From January 25, 2025 it added loans secured by pledges of membership interests rather than by houses.

What was closed or wound down

Everything, in sequence. In May 2024 Landa pulled 50 offerings, most of them properties named in pending foreclosures, disclosing that they had not secured financing and that none of them had investors. Then new offerings stopped, deposits stopped, the secondary market stopped, and dividends stopped in January 2025 for many holders. Since then the Forms 1-U on EDGAR have been almost entirely foreclosure notices and dispositions. On January 16, 2026 Landa Holdings completed the sale of 303 Kelly’s Walk, Locust Grove, Georgia and approved the dissolution of that series, effective on final distribution of proceeds, at which point the units are cancelled. Foreclosure sales on March 3, 2026 took houses out of several Landa App LLC series, and the Manager’s own filing disputes them, alleging the lender skipped the statutory notices and misrepresented the loan’s status, and promises litigation. A Form 1-U on March 31, 2026 reports that the proceeds of two Douglasville, Georgia houses went to liabilities and expenses. Filings run at least to May 19, 2026.

This section counts every dollar that left an investor’s pocket on the way to a tenant, from Landa’s own filings, then shows what a $1,000 position produced.

The stack, as disclosed

Three things stand out. First, the acquisition fee was published as a range, not a number, and the range was wide: at 10% of purchase cost rather than 5%, an extra 5% of the property’s value left the vehicle before a tenant paid a dollar. Second, the fee that looks smallest is the one that compounds: 8% of gross rent, every month for the life of the hold, is roughly one month of rent a year. Third, the “no fees” marketing was about the account, not the trade. A 4% round trip on a position held eighteen months is about twenty times what VNQ would have charged over the same period.

The worked example, in dollars

Take $1,000 invested in Landa single-family shares in early 2022 and held to September 18, 2026.

Step 1, entry. At the 6% acquisition fee Landa’s consumer material described, $60 of the $1,000 bought fee rather than house. At the 10% top of the disclosed range, $100 did. Use 6%: $940 of asset exposure on day one. To break even on that alone you need 6.4% of price appreciation ($60 on $940). Buy the same $1,000 on the in-app market instead of in the offering and the 2% trading fee takes another $20 before you own anything.

Step 2, income. Landa’s Q1 2024 quarterly report claimed an average yield of 6.3% across properties that paid, with a range from 1% to 27%. Apply 6.3% to $1,000 and you get $63 a year, or $15.75 a quarter, before tax. But the average was taken over payers. Bisnow, reading the SEC filings across the three series LLCs for its August 13, 2024 investigation, counted 125 of 218 properties, roughly 57%, holding no cash and paying no distributions in June; CrowdfundedWealth reports the same 125 of 218 and dates it to mid-2023. Take the ratio, not the month. Neither count is one we could re-run ourselves, but both fit Landa’s own Q1 2024 report, which counted 150 properties distributing dividends against a portfolio TechCrunch put near 400 at peak.

Assume, generously, that the $1,000 sat in payers and earned 6.3% from the start of 2022 until dividends stopped in January 2025. Three years at $63 is $189 of gross income, taxed as ordinary dividends. Realistically, with the zero-paying majority in the mix, half that is closer to the truth.

Step 3, exit. There is none. Had the market worked, selling would have cost another 2%, making the round trip 4% on top of the entry fee. It has been paused since 2025. The houses are being sold by the independent manager or taken at foreclosure, and the proceeds go first to the mortgage lender, then to taxes and the costs of the receivership, then to the series’ other liabilities, which include the acquisition note owed to Landa Holdings, and only then to shareholders. In the one disposition we can read in full, the January 16, 2026 sale of 303 Kelly’s Walk, the filing says proceeds will be distributed and the units cancelled, without stating an amount per share.

Net, as of September 18, 2026: roughly $100 to $190 of dividends received, a position with no market, and a residual claim of unknown and probably small value behind a secured lender. Call the realised return negative and unquantified.

The same $1,000 in the liquid alternative. The Vanguard Real Estate ETF (VNQ) charges an expense ratio of 0.13%, which is $1.30 a year on $1,000, and yielded 3.38% as of August 31, 2026 per Vanguard’s own page. That is $33.80 a year of income, less than Landa’s claimed 6.3%, on an instrument you can sell on any trading day at a published price. Over four and a half years the ETF’s fee drag is under $6. Landa’s entry fee alone was $60, and the exit that was supposed to justify it never arrived.

The retail bar is the sum of the three gross-proceeds figures we could read in Regulation A filings as of June 30, 2024: $4,189,825 at Landa App LLC, $7,435,800 at Landa App 3 LLC and $1,410,080 at Landa Financing LLC. We resolved the $7,435,800 to Landa App 3 by the filer’s CIK after a search returned it under Landa App LLC; the total is the same either way. Landa App 2 LLC’s figure is not included because we could not verify it, so the true retail total is higher. Even so, the shape is the point: retail equity was the smallest and most junior layer in a capital stack dominated by secured commercial debt.

This section puts Landa’s published figures next to what investors received, and shows where the gap opened.

What Landa claimed

Landa published quarterly updates on its own site rather than a standing performance page, and never published a platform-level total return. The most complete claim we can date is the Q1 2024 report: 150 properties distributing dividends, $183,893 of dividend income in the quarter, up 8.6% from Q4 2023, an average yield of 6.3% with individual property yields from 1% to 27%, plus $16,874 from Lend, up 10% on the prior quarter, and quarterly rent collection of 95% in its best market, New York. Those are claimed, unaudited platform figures, and they are the high-water mark of Landa’s disclosure.

Do the division. $183,893 across the roughly 25,000 investors in Landa’s own investor presentations is about $7.36 per investor for the quarter, or $29 a year. Across 150 paying properties it is $1,226 per property per quarter. This was never a large income machine. It was a small one with a large user count.

What was realised

• Dividends. Paid monthly, variably, and unevenly, until they stopped. TechCrunch, reporting on May 23, 2025, described a user who had put in more than $8,000 and stopped receiving dividends in the autumn of 2024; other accounts put the stop in January 2025. Since then, nothing has been reported as paid.
• Exits. The disposals on record are foreclosures and distressed sales, not the appreciation exits the model was sold on. In May 2024, lenders LendingOne and Coventus LLC filed to foreclose on 58 Georgia properties securing four loans of $9M, $7.6M, $810K and $341K, per Bisnow, with a sale set for June 4, 2024 whose result Bisnow could not trace. Foreclosure and disposition Forms 1-U continue into May 2026.
• Write-downs. The Landa App 3 LLC semi-annual filing for the six months to June 30, 2024 reports aggregate net losses of $528,143, against $422,145 in the same period of 2023. TechCrunch reported that Landa’s largest fund lost $1.8M in the first half of 2024, more than quadruple its loss in the first half of 2023.
• Going concern. Landa’s audited filings carry the auditors’ standard language of substantial doubt about the ability to continue as a going concern, tied to a lack of liquidity, nominal cash and losses from inception.

The gap, and why it opened

The gap is not a valuation dispute. It is a financing failure that ran through the houses. Landa bought fast in 2021 and 2022 with short-term debt, then held Atlanta single-family rentals into higher rates, higher insurance, higher taxes and slower rent growth. The lenders’ complaint alleges unpaid property taxes that forced fire sales. When the parent could not service its debt, the rent that was supposed to pay your dividend went to the lender instead, and then the lender took the house.

The structural claim that each series was insulated did not protect shareholders in practice. The court order swept 119 houses and their bank accounts together under one independent manager, regardless of which series held which.

Landa’s claimed yield was never the outlier. It was mid-pack and plausible, which is why it was dangerous: the number on the screen told you nothing about whether the parent could refinance.

This section explains what the exit was supposed to be, what it turned out to be, and what a shareholder can do as of September 18, 2026. The short answer is nothing, and that is the defining feature of the product.

The designed exit

Landa’s pitch included a secondary market inside the app. After a property’s initial shares were sold, holders could place market or limit orders that executed Monday to Friday, 09:30 to 17:00 Eastern, with prices set by supply and demand among Landa users. Orders could be entered at any time but only filled in market hours. Each fill carried a 2% fee on both sides, which Landa’s help centre attributes to the third-party broker-dealer. Dalmore was the broker of record for those resales and North Capital’s PPEX ATS was the venue.

Landa’s own help material said these were not listed stocks and that trading and liquidity were not guaranteed. That disclosure did real work. A peer-to-peer market inside one app, for shares in one house in one Atlanta suburb, is only a market when another Landa user wants that house at your price on that day. It was never a redemption right. No series offered one.

The realised exit

There has been no functioning exit since 2025. The site and app failed around April 2025. As of September 18, 2026 landa.app states there are no active offerings and that deposits and secondary trading are paused, with no reopening date. Trustpilot scores landa.app 1.4 out of 5 across 46 reviews, 89% of them one star, the most recent dated June 4, 2026, on recurring themes of suspended trading, withheld dividends and absent support.

What happens when the platform fails, which is no longer hypothetical

The queue on any given house runs: mortgage lender, then unpaid property taxes and insurance, then receivership and sale costs, then the series’ other creditors, which include the acquisition note owed to Landa Holdings, then shareholders. Foreclosure removes the equity entirely. A negotiated sale by the independent manager may leave something. The January 16, 2026 filing on 303 Kelly’s Walk is the template: property sold, series dissolved on final distribution, units cancelled.

The queue is also being contested. In the Form 1-U on the March 3, 2026 foreclosure sales, Landa Holdings disputes the lender’s foreclosure and says it will litigate. A disputed foreclosure is not a faster outcome for a shareholder; it is a longer one.

Anything on an old screenshot is a stale internal mark, not a price. Treat the position as illiquid and unvalued until a series-level dissolution filing on EDGAR says otherwise.

This section gives the forms Landa issued, the character of the income, and the part still live for a former shareholder: the loss.

The forms

Because each Landa series elected to be treated as a corporation for US federal income tax purposes, holders received 1099 forms, not a Schedule K-1. Landa’s help centre said investors would receive Form 1099-DIV, and where relevant Form 1099-B and Form 1099-MISC, no later than January 31 following the tax year, and that a 1099-DIV was issued where an investor earned more than $10 in dividends on any one property in the year.

This was the best thing about the structure. The same portfolio held through partnerships would have produced a stack of K-1s and multi-state filing obligations; the corporate election converted all of it into ordinary dividend reporting on one federal form.

Character of the income

Distributions were dividends from a corporation for tax purposes. Landa published no qualified-dividend analysis we could verify, and the holding-period and payer tests under Section 1(h)(11) are not automatic for an entity of this kind, so assume ordinary income at your marginal rate unless your 1099-DIV says otherwise. Where a series distributed more than its earnings and profits, part of the distribution can be a return of capital that reduces basis rather than taxable income; box 3 of the 1099-DIV is where that appears. Sales on the in-app market produced capital gain or loss on Form 1099-B.

The collectibles rate of 28% under Section 1(h)(4) does not apply here. Real property is not a collectible.

The loss, and when you can take it

Under IRC Section 165(g), a security that is a capital asset and becomes wholly worthless during a tax year is treated as sold on the last day of that year, producing a capital loss. Capital losses offset capital gains first; beyond that, Section 1211(b) allows $3,000 a year against ordinary income, $1,500 if married filing separately, with the excess carried forward indefinitely.

Three cautions. First, worthless means worthless: a 99% decline is not enough while the entity still holds assets or a realistic prospect of recovery, and a house in receivership that may yet be sold is exactly such a prospect. Second, the ordinary-loss exceptions do not apply to a retail Landa holder: Section 165(g)(3) is for affiliated corporations and Section 1244 for original-issue small business stock in an operating company. Third, the year matters. Claiming worthlessness too early invites disallowance; claiming it too late costs the deduction, though Section 6511(d)(1) gives a worthless-securities refund claim seven years from the return’s due date rather than the usual three.

No self-directed IRA custodian we could find supported Landa shares, and Landa’s tax material addresses taxable accounts only. Treat IRA eligibility as unverified.

This section is the dated record. It is the longest here because it is the point of the piece.

The risk that actually ended the investor

Not fraud by a tenant, not a bad neighbourhood, not a vacancy. Platform-level leverage. Landa Holdings raised $62M of debt, much of it short term, secured on the same houses whose equity it sold to retail in $5 slices. When the debt defaulted, the lender took the collateral and the equity went with it. No amount of diligence on one Atlanta three-bedroom would have told you that, and the app did not surface it.

The red flags visible in the filings before the collapse

1. The acquisition fee was a range, 5% to 10%, at the Manager’s sole discretion. A sponsor that will not commit to a number is telling you the number is not the point.
2. Each series bought its house from one affiliate and financed it with a note to another, at up to 4.5% interest, and your subscription repaid it. Investor money was exit liquidity for an affiliate.
3. Going-concern language in the audited filings, tied to lack of liquidity, nominal cash and losses since inception.
4. Losses widening fast: Landa App 3 LLC’s aggregate net loss rose from $422,145 in the first half of 2023 to $528,143 in the first half of 2024, and TechCrunch reported the largest fund’s first-half loss at $1.8M in 2024, more than quadruple the prior year.
5. A shrinking payer count: 150 properties distributing dividends in Q1 2024 against a portfolio reported near 400 at peak, and 125 of 218 properties paying nothing at all.
6. Filing slippage. Landa App LLC’s semi-annual report for the six months to June 30, 2024 was filed on January 3, 2025, months after the normal Regulation A deadline, and it disclosed an unforeseen delay in the annual audited financial statements and the post-qualification amendment for the year to December 31, 2024. Late audits are the most reliable public tell in small-issuer land.

The litigation, dated

• May 2024. Lenders LendingOne and Coventus LLC filed to foreclose on 58 Georgia properties securing four loans of $9M, $7.6M, $810K and $341K (Bisnow, August 2024).
• August 13, 2024. Bisnow published its investigation. Four residents of Landa-owned homes said the company ignored maintenance requests and did not care for the properties; investors reported no communication.
• November 19, 2024. Viola Credit GL I, L.P. et al. v. Landa Holdings, Inc. et al., index 659157/2024, New York County Supreme Court, before Justice Jennifer G. Schecter. The plaintiffs are Viola Credit GL I, L.P., Viola Credit ALF II, L.P. and L Finance LLC; they allege numerous defaults on more than $35M of loans, and unpaid property taxes that forced fire sales.
• November 26, 2024. A temporary restraining order temporarily replaces the manager of certain series LLCs and bars the old manager from acting for them or their assets. Landa App 2 LLC reported it in a Form 1-U.
• December 2024. The court’s injunction orders Landa to turn over rents, bank accounts and operations of 119 houses to an independent manager.
• January 2025. The lenders return to court alleging Landa diverted $724,000 from property accounts and told tenants to send rent to a different bank account not covered by the order.
• February 2025. The court hands 119 properties and their bank accounts to an independent manager, Anna Phillips, who held the same role over the Nightingale Properties entities funded through CrowdStreet. Viola retained her; she brought in B. Riley Financial as property manager with authority to sell properties to satisfy the debt. Justice Schecter also threatens contempt unless the Landa defendants submit to a deposition and stop violating the injunction, with Cohen’s deposition set for March 5, 2025. Bisnow and The Real Deal both report the order, using receiver and independent manager interchangeably; we could not retrieve it.
• March 18, 2025. The docket records a motion for contempt submitted and decided before Justice Schecter.
• Mid-April 2025. Asked by TechCrunch whether the company had shut down, CEO Yishai Cohen said “Of course not. The site will be back up.” Asked why the app was down and why investors had not been paid in months, he said “It’s unrelated to dividends. It’s from our servers.”
• May 23, 2025. TechCrunch publishes the piece that made the collapse public to the wider market.
• January to May 2026. EDGAR fills with dispositions: the Kelly’s Walk sale and series dissolution, completed January 16 and filed February 4; foreclosure sales on March 3 that the Manager disputes as wrongful; a March 31 filing on two Douglasville sales whose proceeds went to liabilities and expenses; emergency borrowings by several series from Landa Financing at 10% interest on March 24 and April 23 to cure reinstatement amounts and stave off further foreclosures; and further Forms 1-U to May 19.

The complaint record

Landa’s Better Business Bureau profile, retrieved September 2026, carries an F rating with 342 complaints closed in the last three years, 6 unresolved and 1 unanswered. TechCrunch put the count at more than 130 in May 2025, so the file roughly tripled in the following year. Trustpilot shows 1.4 out of 5 from 46 reviews, 89% of them one star, the most recent on June 4, 2026. All of it is unverified customer report, and the pattern rather than any single post is the evidence: frozen withdrawals, halted dividends, suspended trading, unanswered support tickets, and investors unable to get an accounting of a specific balance.

Regulatory history

None, as of September 18, 2026: no SEC action, no FINRA action, no state securities order. That absence is worth understanding. Regulation A Tier 2 gave Landa a qualified offering circular and a public filing trail, and it worked as designed: the disclosures were accurate enough that the failure is legible in the filings. What Regulation A does not do is stop a sponsor levering the portfolio, and it appoints nobody to protect shareholders when the lender moves first.

Landa is closed, so this reduces to two narrower questions.

Who still has a reason to engage with Landa

• Anyone holding Landa series shares, who needs to track the court file and the series-level Forms 1-U for the dissolution or foreclosure notice that fixes the tax year of the loss.
• Anyone with a five-figure holding, where a securities lawyer’s fee is a fraction of the claim.
• Investors studying the category, because the Landa circulars are a clean, public example of how an affiliate acquisition note and a discretionary fee range change the economics of a fractional deal.

Who should skip it, and skip the rest of the shape

• Anyone who wants rental income. Realised income here was roughly $29 per investor per year at the platform’s best published quarter, then zero.
• Anyone who needs their money back on a date. There was never a redemption right, only a peer-to-peer market inside one app.
• Anyone buying a platform because the minimum is small. A $5 minimum is a customer-acquisition feature, and it tells you nothing about the capital stack above your shares.
• Anyone who cannot read the offering circular for the specific series. If the fee, the affiliate note and the lender are not legible to you there, the position is not sized correctly at any amount.

This is for the reader who liked the Landa idea and wants the exposure without the Landa structure. Every figure is as of the date given and is the platform’s own unless noted.

Which reader goes where. If you want a named house and a working exit, Ark7 is the only one here with an SEC-registered secondary venue, on the same PPEX ATS Landa used and through the same broker-dealer, and it charges no annual fee, which matters more than a headline yield. For scale and the lowest per-dollar fee inside a private wrapper, Fundrise is the default, with the caveat that its redemption plans are discretionary: the October 1, 2025 suspension of the legacy eREIT plans, followed by their merger into the Flagship Fund on April 29, 2026, is a reminder that quarterly liquidity in a private fund is a policy, not a right. Roots posts the highest number and the shortest hard lock, on self-reported, unaudited performance and a single Sun Belt strategy. Arrived has the heaviest fee stack of the group and a sponsor-controlled exit, which is the Landa shape minus the platform leverage. Lofty trades the securities-law question for liquidity that depends on a token market.

If what you wanted was rental housing exposure rather than the feeling of owning a specific house, a listed single-family rental REIT or VNQ gives you the asset class for 0.13% a year with daily liquidity and audited financials. That is the benchmark every platform in the table has to beat after fees, and on realised numbers most do not.

There is no account to open. Landa has been closed to new money since 2025. This section is what to do if you held Landa shares, in order.

The sequence for a former Landa shareholder

1. Reconstruct the position from your own records. Pull every Landa confirmation email, every dividend notice, your linked bank statements and every 1099-DIV, 1099-B and 1099-MISC Landa issued. The app is not a reliable record and the portal is down. Your bank statements are the unimpeachable ledger of what you sent and what came back.
2. Write down the series, not just “Landa”. Each house is a separate series with its own name, usually a street address. Your tax and claim position is series by series.
3. Track the filings on EDGAR. Search the four CIKs: 1815103, 1875877, 1886606 and 1965132. Forms 1-U carry the foreclosures, sales and dissolutions. A dissolution notice for your series tells you whether anything is coming and, for tax purposes, when the position died.
4. Track the court file. Viola Credit GL I, L.P. et al. v. Landa Holdings, Inc. et al., index 659157/2024, New York County Supreme Court. The New York State courts electronic filing system is the primary record of what the independent manager is doing with the 119 houses. Shareholders are not parties to that suit, which is precisely why you have to read it rather than wait to be told.
5. File the complaints that create a record. The SEC takes investor tips through its online form; FINRA’s complaint programme covers member firms, which matters if your grievance is with the broker-dealer rather than the issuer; your state securities regulator, findable through NASAA, handles state claims. None is a recovery mechanism, but a dated complaint is what makes you findable if a class action or a distribution ever forms.
6. Get the tax year right. A Section 165(g) deduction needs the security to be wholly worthless in the year claimed, and a house still in receivership is not yet a dead claim. Wait for the series’ disposition filing, then take the capital loss.

The six things to read before wiring money to the next one

Landa’s failure is generic, and these six documents would have shown it coming.

1. The offering circular for the specific series, not the platform’s marketing page. Find the fee and check whether it is a number or a range.
2. The related-party transactions section. Look for a note, loan or advance from the sponsor to the vehicle, and for the fact that your subscription repays it.
3. The latest Form 1-K and its audit opinion. A going-concern paragraph is not boilerplate. Find it or confirm it is absent.
4. The filing calendar. Check that the last 1-K and 1-SA arrived on time. A late audit is the single most useful red flag in small-issuer disclosure.
5. The platform’s own debt. Ask, in writing, what the sponsor has borrowed, from whom, at what maturity, and whether the properties backing your shares are collateral. If the answer is not in a filing, assume the worst version.
6. The exit clause. Distinguish a redemption right, which the issuer must honour, from a marketplace, which works only when a stranger wants your specific house at your price on your day.

Landa rates 1 out of 5, and the rating is not a judgement about whether anyone lied. There is no fraud finding, no regulatory action and, as far as the public record goes, no allegation that the houses did not exist. The rating reflects a structure that gave retail investors the worst available position in a capital stack they were never shown, priced it at an entry fee of 5% to 10%, charged 2% a side to leave, and offered an exit that existed only while the sponsor chose to run it.

The mechanism is worth stating plainly because it will recur. A sponsor buys houses with short-term debt at a cyclical top. It sells the equity in $5 slices to people whose entire experience of the investment is a phone screen showing a smiling tenant and a monthly dividend. The subscriptions repay the sponsor’s own affiliate note. The rent pays an 8% management fee to the sponsor before it pays anyone else. When rates, taxes and insurance move against the portfolio and the debt has to be refinanced, the lender’s claim on the collateral is senior to everything the app ever displayed. The shareholders find out through a TechCrunch article.

What would change the verdict. A series-by-series accounting from the independent manager showing actual per-share distributions would change the assessment of the outcome, though not of the structure; a distribution above, say, 25 cents on the dollar in aggregate would beat what this category usually delivers, and we would say so. A court ruling that tests the Delaware series shield in this fact pattern would be the most consequential document to come out of the affair, because every fractional platform in the table above rests on the same untested assumption Landa itself flagged in its help centre.

What to watch, with thresholds and dates. First, EDGAR Forms 1-U under CIKs 1815103, 1875877, 1886606 and 1965132: each dissolution notice fixes a tax year for a specific series, and the pace of filings to May 19, 2026 says the liquidation has a long way to run. Second, the docket in index 659157/2024, for any independent manager’s report, accounting or motion to distribute surplus. Third, the disputed March 3, 2026 foreclosures: if the Manager litigates the wrongful-foreclosure claim it flagged, the affected series stay alive, and unworthless, for another tax year or more. Fourth, whether any annual Form 1-K for fiscal 2024 or later is ever filed: a Form 1-Z or a simple stop to reporting would say the sponsor has stopped pretending. Fifth, whether a shareholder class action is filed; none has surfaced as of September 18, 2026, and the absence after nearly two years suggests the plaintiffs’ bar has priced the recovery at close to zero.

The general rule the Landa file supports: on any fractional platform, your real counterparty is the sponsor’s balance sheet, not the property. Ask what the sponsor owes, to whom and when it is due, before you ask what the house yields.

Nothing here is investment advice.